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Optimal risk nancing in large corporations through
insurance captives
Pierre Picard and Jean Pinquet
Abstract
A captive is an insurance or reinsurance company established by a parent group to
nance its own risks. Captives mix internal risk pooling between the business units of the
parent group and risk transfer toward the reinsurance market. We analyze captives from
an optimal insurance contract perspective. The paper considers the vertical contractual
chain that links rstly business units to insurance captives or to "fronters" through insur-
ance contracts, secondly fronters to reinsurance captives through the cession of risks and
thirdly insurance or reinsurance captives to reinsurers through cessions or retrocessions.
In particular, the risk cession by fronters to a reinsurance captive trades o¤ the benets
derived from recouped premiums and from the risk sharing advantage of an "umbrella
reinsurance policy", against the risks that result from the captive liabilities. The optimal
captive scheme depends on the price of coverage in insurance and reinsurance markets
and on the parent groups corporate capital. Since these variables uctuate across time,
the analysis developed in this paper corroborates the intertemporal variability of captives
activity.
Ecole Polytechnique, Department of Economics. Email : pierre.picard@polytechnique.edu,
jean.pinquet@polytechnique.edu. The authors gratefully acknowledge the nancial support from the
AXA Research Fund (Chair on Large Risk in Insurance).
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1 Introduction
A captive is an insurance or reinsurance company established by a parent group to nance
its own risks. Captive insurance thus provide a risk management technique to nance the
retained losses of a corporation in a separate legal entity.
The captive insurance industry has its origin in the formation of mutuals and co-
insurance companies in the 1920s and 1930s in the US. However the real growth of the
captive industry began in the 1960s and the move by parent companies to establish their
captives o¤shore, particularly in the Bermuda market. The 1970s and 1980s were a
period of tremendous growth of the captive industry. The greatest stimulus was the
cost or lack of availability of certain types of insurance cover in the commercial lines,
particularly liability coverage, but many other considerations apply1. A corporation may
indeed create a captive for various reasons2. Captives allow the parents to mitigate the
uctuations of insurance costs and to save costs by eliminating brokers fees, reducing
transaction costs and avoiding costly insurance regulations. Captives can also access the
capacity of reinsurance markets with lower wholesale prices and higher limits of coverage
than in the retail market. Captives may provide the cover when the commercial market is
unwilling to underwrite certain risks or when the price quoted is too high. They also allow
parents to benet from better-than-average claim experience. Recapturing investment
income and managing cashows is another frequently mentioned motive for creating a
captive. Although taking advantage of tax deductibility is no more the main advantage of
captives, tax advantages may still be gained by using captives, particularly when captives
underwrite unrelated risks in addition to group business3. A captive can also act as a
focus for risk management activities, particularly by providing its parent with a data
warehouse to support its risk prevention e¤orts. Finally, captives allow large corporations
to pool their risks and to retain aggregate losses within their overall risk-bearing capacity,
while o¤ering insurance with relatively small deductibles to their individual business units.
On the negative side, regulation or parentsshortage of capital may sometimes dampen
1The worlds total number of captives was 5,290 in 2009 according to Business Insurances annual
captive survey. Most major corporations now own one or several captives. There are several types of
insurance captives, including single parent captive, group captive, rent-a-captive, protected cell captive
and agency captive, most of them making their home o¤shore; see Banks (2004).
2Porat and Scordis (1998) argue that the creation of captives enhances the status of the risk manager
and test the hypothesis that corporations with heightened manager-owner conicts of interest are more
likely to operate a single-parent captive. They nd that captive creation increases with the size of the
rm, but decreases with Tobins q (the ratio between the market value of the rm and the replacement
value of net assets), which is seen as a proxy for manager-owner conicts. Smith (1986), Cross et al.
(1988), Han and Lai (1991) and Lai and Witt (1995) focus on the tax deductibility issue of captive
insurance premiums. Diallo and Kim (1989) stress the aforementioned advantages of captive creation as
a way to reach a better monitoring of risk prevention activities of the parents business units.
3Cross, Davidson et Thornton (1988) show that captive creation in the USA created value until 1978,
the year after which most tax advantages disappeared.
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enthusiasm for captives4.
Captives mix internal risk pooling between the business units of the parent group
(thereby improving the parents self-insurance capacity) and risk transfer toward the rein-
surance market. The objective of the present paper is to analyze this mechanism from an
optimal insurance contract perspective. Two stylized facts will be in the background of
our analysis. Firstly, cessions to captives are substitutes for contingency and loss provi-
sions and therefore they are targeted at lower risk layers. Put it di¤erently, insurance and
reinsurance captives work as expansion tanks of parent groupsself insurance capacity
and they typically cede or retrocede higher risk tiers to reinsurance markets. In partic-
ular they can o¤er some form of "umbrella policy" to their parent group5. The aim of
this paper is to analyze how such expansion tanks and umbrella policies can improve the
risk sharing between parent groups and insurance or reinsurance rms. From a contract
theory standpoint, captives provide a fascinating case where self-insurance and risk trans-
fer are made of a vertical chain of contracts between fronters, reinsurance captives and
retrocessionnaires. Secondly, it has been extensively documented that insurance markets
are characterized by alternating periods of hard markets with relatively high prices and
limited capacity and soft markets with relatively low prices and plentiful supply - see
Cummins and Doherty (2002). Captivesactivity reacts to this insurance underwriting
cycle. In particular, casual observation suggests that parent groups have used their cap-
tives more intensely when corporate insurance became more expensive or even unavailable
after shocks, particularly in the 1980s for liability lines or in the post-Katrina period.
Conversely, parent groups may keep their captives dormant in soft market periods6. Fur-
thermore, the activity of captives is also a¤ected by wealth e¤ects : a larger amount of
corporate capital available in parent groups provides additional capacity for self-insurance
and is thus likely to induce a more intense use of captives. Conversely, the activity of cap-
tives may slow down after a nancial shock reduced the parentsself-insurance capacity7.
We also aim to understand how such variations in insurance prices and corporate capital
4For example, in a special report on European Captive Insurance, A.M. Best (2009) observe that
"some captives will be forced to close as they fail to comply with the new Solvency II Directive by the
Oct.31, 2012 deadline"and that "the credit crisis has led some parent companies to tap their captives
for cash", and concludes that "the (European) captive market will continue to develop in the face of its
current challenges, although the growth will shift toward the formation of cells rather than the creation
of pure captives".
5In an umbrella policy the indemnity is a deterministic function of the aggregate loss incurred by
the insured (see Gollier, 2000). This is what an holding company can manage through an insurance or
reinsurance captive that will cede or retrocede the holdings aggregate risk to reinsurers.
6Scordis, Barrese and Yokoyama (2007) use Monte Carlo simulation to identify conditions under
which captives have a high probability of creating positive shareholder value, even without favorable tax
treatment. They show that the main feature of a well-managed captive is exibility : such a captive is
incorporated in the least costly captive jurisdiction during a soft insurance market, but remains dormant
until a hard insurance market.
7This is illustrated by recent trends in captive markets : according to Business Insurance (2010, March
8), in 2009 many parent companies have tapped their captives to enhance corporate capital.
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may a¤ect the design of the optimal captive arrangement.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. We consider a rm
made up of a number of decentralized business units that may be subject to insurable
losses. Stabilizing the current cashow of each business unit improves the value of the
rm because it is costly to transfer cash between business units in response to protabil-
ity shocks and because, in addition, the marginal cost of external capital is increasing.
Business units purchase insurance from market insurers and / or from a captive insurance
company created by the rm. Market insurers may also act as "fronters" : they partly
or fully cede the underwritten risks to the captive, which then acts as a reinsurer and
possibly retrocedes the risks to market reinsurers. Sections 3 and 4 respectively focus on
insurance and reinsurance captives. We shall conclude that reinsurance captives dominate
insurance captive for reasonable assumptions on cost parameters. Intuitively a reinsur-
ance captive allows the parent to cumulate the advantage of an "umbrella policy" through
its retrocession activity with the lower underwriting and claims handling costs of fronters.
We analyze the vertical contractual chain that links business units to fronters or directly
to the captive through insurance policies, fronters to the reinsurance captive through the
cession of risks and the captive to reinsurers through cession or retrocession. The risk
cession by fronters to the reinsurance captive trades o¤ the benets derived from recouped
premiums and from the risk sharing advantage of an umbrella reinsurance policy, against
the risks that result from the captive liabilities. The optimal mechanism involves full
cession of risks by the fronter to the captive up to an upper limit, possibly with partial
cession over this limit. Furthermore, business units should have partial insurance at the
margin in order to reach an optimal risk sharing with the captive. The optimal insur-
ance or reinsurance captive scheme depends on various parameters, including the cost of
capital in insurance markets, the reinsurance loading factor and the parent groups cor-
porate capital. Variations in these parameters may trigger changes in the intensity of the
captive activity. Numerical examples illustrate these price and wealth e¤ects. Section 5
concludes. All proofs are in the Appendix.
2 The model
We consider a corporation organized as a holding company, which is made up of n business
units indexed by i = 1; : : : ; n. Each business unit is a subsidiary of the holding company
with specic location and activity. Let i be the sum of initial endowment and cashows
of unit i during the current period. For unexpected low values of i unit imay have to call
up external capital or to delay protable investment projects. In both cases, insu¢ cient
current cashows entail additional costs and lower current or future prots. We assume
that these induced losses occur at an increasing marginal rate because when current
cashows are decreasing then either the cost of external additional capital is increasing
or more protable projects have to be postponed. To capture these two e¤ects of current
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cashows on the value of the rm, we write the contribution of unit i to the shareholder
value of the holding company (i.e. its consolidated expected discounted prots) as Wi =
Bi(i), where Bi is an increasing strictly concave function, i.e. B0i(i) > 0; B
00
i (i) < 0.
The concavity of Bi will provide a rationale for stabilizing the short-term income of unit
i.8 This argument rests on the implicit assumption that the holding company cannot
transfer cash between business units during the current period. Remark 1 below shows
how our model can be extended to a more realistic framework where intraperiod transfers
between business units are feasible but costly.9
The current cashows of business units may be a¤ected by losses that can be covered
by insurance contracts. Insurance can be taken out either in the insurance market (say
from local insurers10) or from a captive created by the holding company. For the time
being, we assume that the captive only acts as direct insurer of business units. The
role of a reinsurance captive will appear in Section 4. Let wi be the sum of initial
endowment and current cashows for unit i, excluding insurable losses and insurance
nancial transfers : w1; : : : ; wn are deterministic parameters and
Pn
i=1wi may be viewed
as the parents group corporate capital.11 Let exi be the insurable losses of unit i. The
variables exi, i = 1 : : : ; n are random and independently distributed over intervals [0; xi]
with cumulative distribution functions i(xi). They have densities 'i(xi)  0i(xi) over
(0; xi] and point masses of probability at xi = 0.
Indemnity schedules Ii(xi) and ti(xi) specify the payment made to unit i respectively
by the local insurer (say by insurer i 12) and by the captive, as a function of realized losses
xi. Ii(xi) and ti(xi) are non-decreasing functions dened over [0; xi]. Let Pi and ki be
the corresponding insurance premiums paid by unit i respectively to insurer i and to the
8See Miller and Orr (1966), Meltzer (1993) and Mulligan (1997) on the cost of being short liquid assets
and having to cut investment or raise external funds. Following Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1993) we
could derive this rationale for corporate hedging from an agency-based approach. See Chapter 6 in Tirole
(2006) for further developments.
9Such transfers may be di¢ cult on a short term basis either because of regulatory restraints or due to
contractual provisions, e.g. in case of of restrictions on currency exchange or when international transfers
require the approval of local partners when a business unit is a joint venture. Even if transferring money
is feasible, it will usually induce transaction costs and it may perturbate the rms tax optimization or
the dividend distribution strategy. Transferring money between business units in an unexpected way
may also perturbate incentives mechanisms and it may exacerbate transitory liquidity problems thereby
inducing additional costs. Hartzell, Titman and Twite (2006) nd empirical support for both transaction
costs and precautionary motives to explain why US multinational rms hold cash, but they also nd
evidence consistent with tax costs associated with repatriating foreign income driving rms to hold more
cash.
10The terminology "local insurer" is used only for the sake of clarity but such insurers may be sub-
sidiaries of the same insurance company, and in practice this is often the case.
11w1; : : : ; wn are given but all that matters is
Pn
i=1 wi because capital can be reallocated between
business units at the beginning of the current period. See the role of variables k1; : : : ; kn below.
12For notational simplicity index i thus simultaneously refers to a specic business unit and to its local
insurer.
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captive.13 We thus have
i = wi   xi + Ii(xi)  Pi + ti(xi)  ki for all i = 1; : : : ; n: (1)
The risks underwritten by the captive may be ceded through a reinsurance contract
which provides payment T (t1; : : : ; tn) to the captive as a function of the transfers made
to the business units, with the cession of premiums Q to reinsurers.
Local insurers and the captive bear xed underwriting costs. Operating in market i,
i.e. in the area of activity of business unit i, requires incurring xed costs fi for local
insurer i and bfi for the captive (respectively when Ii(xi) > 0 and ti(xi) > 0 with positive
probability).14 Reinsurance xed underwriting costs are denoted by f0. Insurance and
reinsurance costs also include variable costs (claims handling costs and capital costs)
which take the form of loadings at rate i for local insurer i and  for reinsurers. We
assume that claim handling costs are proportional to the amount of claims, while capital
costs are proportional to the losses that are retained by the insurer.15 We break down the
insurer is loading factor by writing i = 
c
i + 
k
i , where 
c
i refers to the claims handling
cost, while ki correspond to capital costs. Because of competitive pressure, insurance
premiums charged by local insurers and reinsurers just cover expected costs, including
xed underwriting costs and variable costs. We thus have
Pi = (1 + 
c
i + 
k
i )E[Ii(exi)] + fi if i 2 A` (2)
Q = (1 + )E[T (t1(ex1); : : : ; tn(exn))] + f0; (3)
where A`  f1; : : : ; ng denotes the set of business units insured by local insurers (i.e. such
that Ii(xi) > 0 with positive probability), with Pi = 0 if i =2 A`.
The captive also incurs variable costs, which include claim handling costs proportional
to the amount of led claims at rate bci and capital cost. The capital cost corresponds
to the opportunity cost of transferring nancial resources from the business units to
the captive through insurance premium ki, which is reected by functions Bi(:). For
notational simplicity, we assume that the captive has no initial endowment. Its current
prot is written as
0 =
nX
i=1
ki  
X
i2Ac
[(1 + bci)ti(xi) + bfi] + T (t1(x1); : : : ; tn(xn)) Q; (4)
13For simplicity we refer to ki as a "premium" although it includes all forms of nancial transfer
from business unit i to the captive. Tax issues are completely ignored in this model, which makes this
aggregation of nancial ows possible.
14Direct insurers can spread such xed costs among several customers (at least if there are other
rms operating in the same area of activity that purchase insurance from insurer i) while the captive
only underwrites the risks of its parents subsidiaries. Consequently, local insurers enjoy underwriting
economies of scale by comparison with the captive, which suggests that we should have fi < bfi. However
the captive insurer may be specialized in the type of risk run by the corporation, which may be the source
of an information advantage over the local insurers, hence lower underwriting costs and thus possiblybfi < fi in such a case.
15Risk cession by local insurers to the captive will be considered in Section 4.
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where Ac  f1; : : : ; ng refers to the set of business units insured by the captive (i.e. such
that ti(xi) > 0 with positive probability)16.
When 0 is low, the captive breaks even by calling up external capital at an increasing
marginal cost. Similarly to business units, the contribution of the captive to the holding
companys shareholder value is thus written as W0 = B0(0), with B00(0) > 0; B
00
0 (0) <
0 17.
An insurance captive scheme fIi(xi); Pi; ti(xi); ki for i = 1; : : : ; n;T (t1; : : : ; tn); Qg is
feasible if it satises (2) and (3). The holding company chooses a feasible insurance scheme
that maximizes its expected consolidated shareholder value W , which comes additively
from the business units and from the captive. The shareholder value may thus be written
as
W = E
"
nX
i=0
Wi
#
= E
"
nX
i=0
Bi(i)
#
;
where 0 and 1; : : : ;n are respectively given by (4) and (1).
Remark 1
The present modelling can easily be extended to the case where the holding company
can transfer funds between business units during the current period, but such transfers
induce transaction costs. Letmij denote the transfer from unit i to unit j with transaction
cost cij per unit of transferred money and w.l.o.g. we assume that this cost is incurred
by unit i. In other words, unit i pays (1 + cij)mij while unit j receives mij. Now the net
cashows of unit i are written asbi = i +X
j 6=i
mji  
X
j 6=i
(1 + cij)mij.
where i is dened as before for all i = 0; : : : ; n. The contribution of unit i (including
the captive) to the shareholder value of the holding company is written as Bi(bi). Given
0,. . . ,n; the optimal transfers maximize
nX
i=0
Bi(bi) = nX
i=0
Bi(i +
X
j 6=i
mji  
X
j 6=i
(1 + cij)mij)
16The holding company may nd that it is optimal to recapitalize the captive by transfering money
from business units that buy insurance only from local insurers. We thus may have ki 6= 0 even if i =2 Ac.
We may have A` \ Ac 6= ;, i.e. some business units may buy insurance at the same time from local
insurers and from the captive.
17The concavity of function B0(0) conveys the risk aversion of the holding company w.r.t. the captives
cashows, with the same capital market rationale behind this assumption as for business units. See Froot
and Stein (1998) and Froot (2007) on nancial institutionsrisk management when uctuations in internal
cash result in uctuations in costs of raising external funds.
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with respect tomij  0 for all i; j; i 6= j, with obviouslymjimij = 0 for all i; j; i 6= j for the
optimal solution. Let U(0;1; :::;n) be the value function of this optimization problem.
Since Bi(:) is concave for all i; U(0;1; : : : ;n) is a multi-variable concave function. In
what follows
Pn
i=0Bi(i) may be replaced by U(0;1; : : : ;n) as the objective function
of the holding company without any change in the arguments and the conclusions. Our
results are thus robust to the possibility of implementing costly intraperiod transfers
between business units. For the sake of notational simplicity we will use the separable
objective function
Pn
i=0Bi(i), but our modelling can be extended to such a broader
setting.
3 Optimal insurance captive schemes
Corporations that use an insurance captive trade o¤ the benets associated with an
umbrella reinsurance policy against costs which may be larger for the captive than for
local insurers. Obviously, when local insurer i is faced with larger variable and xed costs
than the captive, then business unit i should purchase insurance only from the captive.
When this is not the case, the balance may tip in favor of the captive or the local insurer.
A business unit may even purchase insurance from both sources.
Proposition 1 An optimal insurance captive scheme species that all business units i
such that (1 + )(1 + bci)  1 + i and bfi  fi purchase insurance only from the captive,
while other units may purchase insurance from the captive and/or from the local insurer.
The captive cedes a part of the underwritten risk through a stop-loss reinsurance contract
T (t1; : : : ; tn) 
hPn
i=1(1 +
bci)ti  Di+, with D > 0 and x+ = max(x; 0).
Let us start commenting on Proposition 1 with its second part. The captive should cede
its aggregate loss
Pn
i=1(1 +
bci)ti (claims handling cost included) through a reinsurance
stop-loss contract with deductible D. This is analogous to the optimality of straight
deductible contracts in the case of insurance demand by a risk averse individual under
constant loading. Through its reinsurance contract, the insurance captive provides an
umbrella policy to the holding company, i.e. a cover for the aggregate loss
Pn
i=1(1+
bci)ti,
which may be more e¢ cient than independent coverage separately obtained by business
units from local insurers.
This e¢ ciency gain associated with the captive umbrella policy may be annihilated if
the captive is subject to higher costs than local insurers, and the rst part of Proposition
1 gives su¢ cient conditions for covering the risk through the captive to be optimal. These
conditions are more easily interpreted if we observe that (1 + )(1 + bci)E[Ii(exi)] is the
captives variable cost for risks that are ceded to reinsurers, while (1+i)E[Ii(exi)] denotes
the local insurer variable cost. If xed underwriting costs fi and bfi are large enough
for purchasing insurance simultaneously from the local insurer and from the captive to
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be suboptimal, then business units are split between two groups (i.e. A` \ Ac = ; as
represented in Figure 1) according to whether or not the benets of a better risk sharing
through an umbrella policy are larger than the increase in xed underwriting costs (whenbfi > fi) and/or variable costs (when (1 + )(1 + bci) > 1 + i ). When the balance tips
in favor of the risk sharing advantage, then the business units should be insured by the
captive, while they should be insured by local insurers in the other case.
Figure 1
As an illustration of Proposition 1, observe that condition (1 + )(1 + bci) < 1 + i
is approximately equivalent to ki    > bci   ci for small loading factors. The right
hand side of this inequality corresponds to di¤erences in claim handling costs between
the captive and local insurer i and we may consider it as a structural e¢ ciency gap. The
left hand side is the di¤erence between the savings on direct insurance capital cost if a
risk is transferred from local insurer i to the captive and the reinsurance costs should
this risk be ceded by the captive. We may then think of hard market situations where
the underwriting capacity of direct insurers is limited because they meet di¢ culties in
raising additional capital, which result in an increase in ki . For given state of reinsurance
market (i.e. for  unchanged) transferring the business units risk to the captive is then
more likely to be an optimal choice than in soft market periods where ki would be lower.
Put di¤erently, if local insurer i has experienced adverse underwriting conditions in year
t, then it is likely to have a higher cost of capital ki in year t+ 1, with more cessions to
captives. This is all the more likely given that the adverse shocks have been specic for
insurer i and did not come with a hard reinsurance market.18
We now turn to the characterization of the optimal insurance coverage o¤ered by the
captive and local insurers. Substituting T (t1; : : : ; tn) =
hPn
i=1(1 +
bci)ti  Di+ ; in (3)
and (4), the optimal insurance captive scheme maximizes
W = E
"
B0
 
nX
i=1
ki  min
(X
i2Ac
(1 + bci)ti(exi); D
)
 
X
i2Ac
bfi  Q!#
+
nX
i=1
E [Bi (wi   exi + Ii(exi)  Pi + ti(exi)  ki)] ; (5)
with respect to ki; Pi and Ii(:); ti(:)  0 for all i and D  0 subject to (2) and
Q = (1 + )E
"(
nX
i=1
(1 + bci)ti(exi) D
)+#
+ f0: (6)
18The analysis of Weiss and Chung (2004) and Meier and Outreville (2006) suggest that the price of
coverage in insurance and reinsurance markets do not move in a perfectly synchronized way. As observed
by Scordis et al. (2007), this creates an arbitrage opportunity, which allows rms possessing insurance
captives to shop across two markets, and also to treat the captive as a source of exibility when the
insurance market hardens.
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Proposition 2 characterizes the optimal insurance captive mechanism when xed under-
writing costs lead each business unit to buy insurance either from the local insurer or
from the captive, but not from both simultaneously.
Proposition 2 When A` \ Ac = ;, an optimal insurance captive scheme is dened by
d0i ; d
1
i > 0 such that
Ii(xi) =
 
xi   d0i
+
if i 2 A`;
ti(xi) = 0 if xi  d1i and
dti(xi)=dxi 2 (0; 1) if xi > d1i if i 2 Ac:
The optimal insurance coverage obtained from local insurers is a straight deductible
contract, i.e. local insurer i fully covers the losses above the deductible d0i if i 2 A`. This
is a well-known optimal insurance characterization under constant loading and there is
nothing new here. As for the captive, it o¤ers coinsurance coverage to business units i
in Ac when losses exceed threshold d1i . As shown in the proof of Proposition 2, a positive
optimal transfer ti(xi) equalizes the expected marginal value of cash in business unit i
and in the captive. This equality may be written as
B0i (wi   xi + ti(xi)  ki ) = (1 + bci)E[B00(0) j ti(xi)] (7)
where E[B00(0) jti(xi) ] denotes the expected marginal value of an increase in the captive
prot conditionally on ti(xi).19 We have @E[B00(0) jti ]=@ti > 0 because B0(:) is a concave
function and an increase in ti decreases the captive expected cashows anything else given,
because of the reinsurance deductible D. Di¤erentiating (7) and using B00i < 0 then gives
dti(xi)=dxi 2 (0; 1). Note that D = 0 would be optimal if  = 0: We would have
dti(xi)=dxi = 1 in that case, which highlights the fact that the coinsurance arrangement
between the captive and the business units arises from the reinsurance loading. The proof
of Proposition 2 also shows that it would be optimal to cover losses of any size if bci = 0,
but because of the captive claims handling costs small losses should not be covered, i.e.
we have d1i > 0. We thus have a clear-cut connection between the captive cost factors and
the shape of its indemnity schedule: rstly business units should receive partial coverage
"at the margin" because the captive is subject to reinsurance costs and secondly small
losses should be retained because of claims handling costs.
The optimal insurance captive scheme depends on all the parameters which have
been introduced so far, including : local insurers capital cost bki , claims handling costs
ci ;
bci , underwriting xed costs fi; bfi; f0, reinsurance loading  and initial endowments
w1; : : : ; wn. The optimal scheme also depends on the probability distribution of losses
19In E[B00(0) jti(xi) ] the expected value operator is with respect to transfers from the captive to all
local insurers j 6= i by taking into account the captives reinsurance. See the proof of Proposition 2 in
the Appendix.
10
ex1; : : : ; exn and on the shape of value functions B0; B1; : : : ; Bn. We are more particularly
interested in the e¤ect of capital cost, reinsurance loading and initial endowments. Indeed
the activity of the captive industry is highly cyclical and understanding how price and
wealth variations result in more or less risk cessions to the captive may contribute to a
better understanding of this cyclical activity.
Let us present numerical examples derived from a simplied version of the model.
Consider a symmetric version of our model, with n identical business units: nc units are
insured by the captive and n` = n  nc units purchase insurance from local insurers. We
thus assume A` \ Ac = ; because of xed underwriting costs. For each business unit, an
accident occurs with probability p, and in that case the loss x is uniformly distributed
over an interval [0; x]. We also assume Bi(i) = ln(i) for all i = 0; 1; : : : ; n. Let
c; bc; k; f; bf; P be respectively the claims handling costs, the capital cost, the xed
underwriting cost and the premium charged by local insurers. w1 denotes the initial
endowment of a business unit and kc (respect. k`) denotes the transfer to the captive
from any business unit that is insured (respect. not insured) by the captive. Finally
 and D still denote the reinsurance loading and deductible. In all our derivations we
assume n = 10; p = 0:1; x = 0:5; f = bfc = 0:005; f0 = 0.20
When X1; : : : ; Xn are i:i:d:random variables with the same distribution as X, we write
Xn  Pni=1Xi. Equations (2),(3) and (5) are then rewritten as
P = (1 + c + k) E[I(ex)] + f;
Q = (1 + ) E

(1 + bc) (t(ex))nc  D+ ;
W = E
h
ln

nckc + (n  nc)k`   nc bfc  Q minnD; (1 + bc) [t(ex)]ncoi
+ncE [ln(w1   ex+ t(ex)  kc)] + nlE [ln(w1   ex+ I(ex)  P   k`)] :
where I(x) and t(x) are the indemnity schedules respectively o¤ered by local insurers
and by the captive, with I(x) = (x  d0)+. For the sake of computational simplicity,
we restrict attention to piecewise linear indemnity schedules o¤ered by the captive and
we thus write t(x) = a(x   d1)+, with 0 < a < 1. W is maximized with respect to
nc 2 f0; 1; : : : ; 10g; kc; k`; d0; d1; a; D subject to the constraints that dene P and Q.
Table 1 allows us to visualize the e¤ects of changes in cost parameters and wealth on the
optimal insurance captive scheme.21 RRRH denotes the Risk Retention Rate measured
at the Holding level. Results show that an all or nothing solution is optimal, i.e. all
20Assumption f = bfc = 0:005 guarantees that it is optimal to purchase insurance either from the
captive or from a local insurer but not from both sources simultaneously. Assumption f0 = 0 is made in
order to suppress any discontinuity e¤ect when the captive is active (say with at least one business unit)
and when it is not.
21The value of each business unit and the insurance premiums have a closed form in our setting. This is
not the case neither for the reinsurance premium nor for the value of the captive because of the intricate
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business units should purchase insurance from the captive or none of them should do it.
When c = bc (no structural e¢ ciency gap), we know from Proposition 1 that a su¢ cient
condition for purchasing insurance from the captive to be optimal is (approximately)
k > . When k < , the optimal scheme trades o¤ the advantages of an umbrella policy
o¤ered by the captive against the lower costs of local insurers. In the cases considered
in Table 1, the captive dominates local insurers for values of the capital cost k that
are lower than the reinsurance loading . Note that a 20% rate of return on capital
and a ratio of capital to expected loss of 20% would correspond to k = 0:04. When
c = bc =  = 0:05 and w1 = 1, transferring risks to the captive and reinsuring them
with deductible D = 0:10 is more advantageous than purchasing insurance from local
insurers even if their cost of capital loading is only k = 0:045 (and a fortiori if it is
larger). The local insurer solution dominates the captive solution when k  0:04 and
there is a jump in RRRH from 29:4% to 49:0% when self-insurance through the captive
becomes optimal after a small increase in the cost of capital from 0:04 to 0:045. Increases
in claims handling costs c and bc lead to larger deductibles either by local insurers or by
the captive, which is in line with standard results in optimal insurance contract theory22:
for instance if  = 0:05; w1 = 1 and 
c and bc increase from 0:05 to 0:1, then d0 increases
from 0:07 to 0:11 if k = 0:03 and d1 increases from 0:06 to 0:11 if k  0:047.
distribution of the cumulated costs transferred to the insurance captive. We derived these values by
numerical integration and solved the program with a heuristic algorithm. In this algorithm, units were
10 3 for kc and k` and 10 2 for the other variables. Computational di¢ culties were mainly about the
risk transferred to the captive, because of the convolution law [t(ex)]nc . Note that the optimal solution
obtained for nc = n does not depend on the cost of capital 
k. Such a solution was compared with the
optimal solution obtained for nc = 0, which depends on 
k. Dominant interior solutions with respect to
nc 2 (0; n) were not found.
22The consequences of an increase in the loading factor on the optimal level of insurance coverage may
be analysed by distinguishing a substitution e¤ect and an income e¤ect, as in the classical theory of
consumer demand; see Schlesinger (2000).
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Table 1 : Some numerical derivations for optimal insurance captive schemes
Parameters Variables
k c; bc  w1 nc d0 k` d1 a kc D RRRH
0:03 0:05 0:05 1 0 0:07 0:088         26%
0:04 0:05 0:05 1 0 0:08 0:088         29:4%
 0:045 0:05 0:05 1 10     0:06 0:90 0:112 0:10 49%
0:03 0:1 0:05 1 0 0:11 0:088         39:2%
0:04 0:1 0:05 1 0 0:12 0:088         42:2%
 0:047 0:1 0:05 1 10     0:11 0:92 0:109 0:09 56:9%
0:03 0:05 0:1 1 0 0:07 0:088         26%
0:04 0:05 0:1 1 0 0:08 0:088         29:4%
 0:075 0:05 0:1 1 10     0:09 0:88 0:110 0:17 70:8%
0:03 0:05 0:05 2 0 0:15 0:179         51%
 0:036 0:05 0:05 2 10     0:13 0:81 0:196 0:16 81:4%
Table 1 also illustrates the consequences of an increase in the reinsurance loading
factor. Consider the case where k  0:075; c = bc = 0:05; w1 = 1 : if  increases from
0:05 to 0:1, then D increases from 0:10 to 0:17, which is the standard direct e¤ect of an
increase in the reinsurance loading, and simultaneously d1 increases from 0:06 to 0:09 and
a lowers from 0:90 to 0:88, which is an induced e¤ect : higher reinsurance costs lead the
captive to provide less complete insurance coverage to business units. Finally, increasing
the business unitsinitial endowments leads to more retention within the captive and the
business units, because the ln(:) function entails the same kind of wealth e¤ect as the
decreasing absolute risk aversion of standard expected utility theory. For instance, when
c = bc =  = 0:05, if w1 increases from 1 to 2, then D increases from 0:10 to 0:16, d1
increases from 0:06 to 0:13 and a decreases from 0:90 to 0:81 if the business units purchase
insurance from the captive, while d0 increases from 0:07 or 0:08 to 0:15 if insurance is
obtained from local insurers, with an important increase in the retention rate in both
cases.
In short, some important features of an optimal insurance captive scheme emerge from
these numerical results, where there is no structural e¢ ciency gap between local insurers
and the captive. Firstly, because of the umbrella policy mechanism, using a captive may
be protable to the rm even if reinsurance costs exceed the savings on direct insurance
capital cost. Conversely, for given reinsurance costs, if the local insurerscapital cost is
low enough (which is likely to be the case in periods of soft insurance markets with large
insurerssurplus), then the rm may turn to local insurers and keep its captive dormant,
even if it means reinvigorating the captive later, under more favorable market conditions.
Secondly, changes in reinsurance loading lead to more or less risk cessions by the captive to
reinsurers, and indirectly to more or less retentions in business units. Since, capital costs
and reinsurance rates do not move in a perfectly synchronized way, there are arbitrage
opportunities, which also explains the structural instability in the activity of the captive
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industry. Thirdly, because of a wealth e¤ect the larger the rms initial endowment, the
larger the risk retention in the captive and in the business units, which reinforces the
price e¤ect argument for the variability in the captive activity. When changes in price
or wealth parameters make the use of the captive protable, there is a jump in the risk
retention rate of the holding company, which illustrates the role of captives as expansion
tanks for the parents self-insurance capacity.
4 Fronting and reinsurance captives
Let us come back to our general model and assume now that the captive can also act as
a reinsurer, with local insurers behaving as fronters for the business units. The cession of
risks by insurer i to the captive is written as Ci(Ii); Ki where Ci(Ii) refers to the transfer
from the captive to insurer i as a function of losses Ii, with 0  Ci(Ii)  Ii and Ki is
the amount of premium ceded to the captive.23 With such cessions, the claims handling
costs incurred by local insurer i are still proportional to the amount of claims Ii(xi) as
before, but now capital costs are proportional to retained claims Ii(xi)  Ci(Ii(xi)) since
no capital allocation is required for ceded risks. Because of competitive pressures, ceded
premiums are equal to the decrease in local insurerscapital cost induced by cessions. We
thus have
Ki = (1 + 
k
i )ECi(Ii(exi)) (8)
The captive cedes or retrocedes risks through a reinsurance contract that species a
transfer to the captive T (t1; : : : ; tn; C1; : : : ; Cn) as a function of the payments to business
units t1; : : : ; tn and to local insurers C1; : : : ; Cn, with Ci = Ci(Ii) for all i. We thus have
Q = (1 + )E[T (t1(ex1); : : : ; tn(exn); C1(I1(ex1)); : : : ; Cn(In(exn))] + f0: (9)
The captives prot is now written as
0 =
nX
i=1
ki  
X
i2Ac
[(1 + bci)ti(xi) + bfi] +X
i2A`
[Ki   Ci(Ii(xi))]
+T (t1(x1); : : : ; tn(xn); C1(I1(x1)); : : : ; Cn(In(xn))) Q; (10)
where Ac and A` still respectively denote the set of business units that are directly insured
by the captive or by local insurers .
An insurance-reinsurance captive scheme is now written as fIi(xi); Pi;
ti(xi); ki; Ci(Ii); Ki for i = 1; : : : ; n;T (t1; : : : ; tn; C1; : : : ; Cn); Qg. It is feasible if it satis-
es (2),(8) and (9). An optimal insurance captive scheme maximizesW = E[
Pn
i=0Bi(i)],
where 0 and 1; : : : ;n are respectively given by (10) and (1).
23In the reinsurance terminology, this is a non-proportional reinsurance mechanism. In the present set-
ting, ignoring any underwriting commission, proportional reinsurance would correspond to the particular
case where Ci(Ii) = ciIi and Ki = ciPi, with ci 2 [0; 1] the cession rate.
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Proposition 3 shows that the optimal risk sharing mechanism takes a simple form when
local insurers have lower claim handling costs and underwriting costs than the captive.
Indeed using local insurers as fronters allows the parent group to cumulate the advantages
of an umbrella policy through the retrocession of risks by the captive and the benets of
lower claim handling and underwriting costs, while the direct insurers capital costs can
be recouped through ceded premiums. Proposition 3 is illustrated with Figure 2 : all the
claims go through the local insurers who act as fronters and the captive only acts as a
reinsurer.
Proposition 3 An optimal insurance-reinsurance captive scheme species that ti(xi)  0
for all i such that ci  bci(1 + ) and fi  bfi , i.e. when variable claim handling
costs and xed underwriting costs are lower for local insurers than for the captive, then
local insurers are fronters: the business units purchase insurance from local insurers only.
The captive retrocedes a part of the underwritten risks through a a stop-loss reinsurance
contract T (C1; : : : ; Cn) 
Pn
i=1((1 +
bci)ti + Ci) D+, with D > 0.
Figure 2
From now on we will assume ci  bci(1 + ) and fi  bfi for all i and thus Ac = ?
and A` = f1; : : : ; ng. The remaining part of the paper restricts attention to this case of a
pure reinsurance captive. Using T (: : : ; Ci; : : :) = (
Pn
i=1Ci  D)+, an optimal insurance
scheme maximizes
W = E
"
B0
 
nX
i=1
(ki +Ki) min
(
nX
i=1
Ci(Ii(exi)); D) Q!#
+
nX
i=1
E [Bi (wi   exi + Ii(exi)  Pi   ki)] ; (11)
with respect to ki; Ki; Pi; Ii(:); Ci(:)  0 for all i and D  0 subject to (2), (8), 0 
Ci(Ii)  Ii and
Q = (1 + )E
" 
nX
i=1
Ci(Ii(exi)) D!+#+ f0: (12)
Proposition 4 An optimal reinsurance captive scheme is dened by Ii 2 (0; +1); d1i >
d0i > 0 for all i = 1; : : : ; n such that
Ci(Ii) = minfIi; Ii g;
Ii(xi) = 0 if xi  d0i ;
dIi(xi)=dxi 2 (0; 1) if d0i  xi  d1i + Ii ;
Ii(xi) = xi   d1i if xi > d1i + Ii :
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Proposition 4 is illustrated with Figure 3.24 Ii is an upper limit on cessions by local
insurer i to the reinsurance captive and d0i is a deductible for business unit i, with partial
marginal coverage over [d0i ; d
1
i + I

i ] and full marginal coverage above d
1
i + I

i .
Figure 3
The intuition of Proposition 4 is as follows. Let us look rst at the determinants of
optimal cessions to the reinsurance captive. For a given retrocession deductible D and
for given Ij(:) for all j and Cj(:) for all j 6= i, increasing Ci(Ii) when Ii is in some interval
[a; b] leads to larger ceded premiums Ki and also to larger costs incurred by the captive
either directly when
Pn
j=1Cj < D or indirectly through an increase in the retroceded
premium Q. The optimal cession scheme Ci(Ii) = minfIi; Ii g trades o¤ the gains drawn
from the ceded premiums and the risk sharing advantage of an umbrella policy against
the increase in the captive risks.
A precise denition of the cession upper limit Ii is provided in the proof of Proposition
4 but its intuition is rather straightforward. Let E[B00(0)] be the expected marginal
shareholder value of an increase in the captive prot and let E[B00(0) jCi ] denote this
expected marginal value conditionally on the transfer from the captive to local insurer i
being equal to Ci.25 The proof of Proposition 4 shows that it is optimal to increase Ci
when E[B00(0) jCi ] < (1 + ki )E [B00(0)] because in that case, given the local insurers
cost of capital ki , the positive shareholder value of larger recouped premium exceeds the
negative shareholder value of larger captive liabilities. It is thus optimal to increase Ci as
much as possible, and thus to choose Ci(Ii) = Ii, when Ii < Ii , where I

i is dened by
E[B00(0) jCi = Ii ] = (1 + ki )EB00(0):
Hence Ci(Ii) = Ii is optimal when Ii  Ii and the rm should choose Ci(Ii) = Ii when
Ii > I

i .
The shape of the optimal cession treaty Ci(Ii) = minfIi; Ii g a¤ects the shape of the
insurance coverage provided by the local insurer to the business unit. When xi is not
too large, we have Ii(xi) < Ii . Then any increase in Ii(xi) is reected by an equivalent
increase in the ceded risks Ci(Ii). Hence when xi is increasing, the increase in Ii(xi)
should reach an optimal compromise between providing additional coverage to business
unit i and not inducing too much additional risks for the captive. This compromise leads
to partial coverage "at the margin", i.e. a coinsurance mechanism dIi(xi)=dxi 2 (0; 1).
Insurance coverage is triggered only when the loss is larger than the threshold d0i since, as
24For the sake of graphical simplicity, in Figure 3 function Ii(xi) is drawn as if it were piecewise linear,
which may not be the case. The same remark applies for Ii(xi) and Ci(Ii) in the case of Figure 4 below.
25See the proof of Proposition 3 in the Appendix for explicit denitions of E[B00(0)] and E[B
0
0(0) jCi ].
In these expressions, expected values are taken with respect to transfers from the captive to all local insur-
ers j 6= i by taking into account the captives retrocession operations. We have @E[B00(0) jCi ]=@Ci > 0
because B0(:) is a concave function and an increase in Ci decreases the captive prot anything else given.
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usual, because of transaction costs it is optimal to have zero coverage when losses are very
low. When xi is large enough (xi  d1i +Ii ), we have Ii(xi)  Ii and then increasing Ii(xi)
has no e¤ect on the captive earnings : it is only reected by an increase in the premium
Pi paid to the local insurer, without any change in premiums ceded to the captive. In
that case, the optimal insurance contract then species full coverage at the margin, i.e.
Ii(xi) = xi   d1i as in standard insurance contract with constant loading.
We have assumed so far that the capital loading is proportional to the expected in-
demnity cost incurred by local insurers. Although proportional loadings are usual in the
literature on optimal insurance contracting, this is not a very satisfactory assumption
when corporate insurance demand is at stake, particularly for multinational corporations
that may incur large risks, and it may even be regarded as completely unacceptable when
the focus is on insurance capital requirements. Indeed the capital costs involved by in-
surersrisk management and by regulatory constraints may be small or even negligible
for small risks that do not a¤ect the solvency of the insurers, while they strongly increase
when insurers face large size liabilities. This is more adequately modelled by assuming
that capital costs depend on insurersliabilities in a non-linear way.
Let us now write insurer is capital cost as E[Zi(Ii(exi))], where function Zi(:) is such
that Z 0i > 0 and Z
00
i  0. So far we had Zi(xi)  ki xi, but now assuming more generally
that Zi(:) is a convex function allows us to consider the case where small risks do not
involve any signicant e¤ect on insurersrequired capital, while an increase in the exposure
to large risks would result in a large increase in capital loading. Under this assumption,
the premium charged by local insurer i is written as
Pi = (1 + 
c
i)E [Ii(exi)] + E [Zi(Ii(exi))] + fi (13)
instead of (2).26 The premiums which are ceded by local insurer i to the reinsurance
captive include the decrease in the capital cost, which goes down from E[Zi(Ii(exi))] to
E[Zi(Ii(exi)  Ci(Ii(exi)))] when the local insurers risk exposure goes down from Ii(exi) to
Ii(exi)  Ci(Ii(exi)). We thus have
Ki = E[Ci(Ii(exi))] + E[Zi(Ii(exi))]  E[Zi(Ii(exi)  Ci(Ii(exi)))]; (14)
instead of (8).
26Equation (13) reects the empirical observation that capital requirements increase more than propor-
tionally with the size of the insurers liabilities, and that the highest loss layers have the strongest e¤ect
on the allocation of capital among lines of business. This will be the case if the insurer allocates capital
to lines of business based upon their contribution to the total rms VaR (99%) loss scenario or if Tail
Value at Risk (TVaR) is used as a basis for allocating capital. In such cases, capital is mainly allocated
to perils that contribute to the worst scenarios - see Kreps (2005) and Venter (2006). Bodo¤ (2009)
describes a formulation of VaR capital that allocates capital to all losses rather than only to extreme
losses in the tail of the distribution, but in Bodo¤s formulation capital is allocated disproportionally
to severe losses. A di¤erent approach would consist in assuming that insurance prices are given by the
expectation of costs (particularly capital costs) with respect to a distorted probability as in the approach
of Wang (1996, 2000).
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Proposition 5 Assume that the local insurers cost of capital is E[Zi(Ii(exi))] with Z 0i > 0
and Z 00i  0. Then an optimal insurance scheme is dened by Ii 2 (0; +1); d1i > d0i > 0
for all i = 1; : : : ; n such that
Ci(Ii) = Ii if Ii  Ii ;
0 <
dCi
dIi
< 1 if Ii > Ii ;
Ii(xi) = 0 if xi  d0i ;
dIi(xi)=dxi 2 (0; 1) if xi > d0i ;
with I 0i+(d
1
i ) > I
0
i (d
1
i ) if Ii(d
1
i ) = I

i .
Proposition 5 is illustrated with Figure 4. Assuming that the marginal cost of capital
is increasing provides a di¤erent picture of the optimal cession mechanism. Now the
equality between expected costs and expected benets of an increase in ceded premiums
is written as
E[B00(0) jCi ] = [1 + Z 0i(Ii   Ci)]E[B00(0)];
where the variable marginal cost of capital Z 0i(Ii  Ci) has been substituted to ki . There
exists an upper limit on indemnities Ii given by
E[B00(0) jCi = Ii ] = [1 + Z 0i(0)]E[B00(0)]
such that the risk is fully ceded to the reinsurance captive when Ii is lower than Ii ,
but there are partial cessions "at the margin" when Ii exceeds Ii . As in the case of
constant marginal cost of capital, the optimal cession scheme Ci(Ii) results from the
trade-o¤ between on one side the gain drawn both from the ceded premiums and from
the better risk sharing provided by an umbrella policy and on the other side the increase
in the captive costs. When Ii < Ii the balance tips in favor of increasing the cession
even with the smallest capital marginal costs Z 0i(0) ceded to the captive and in that case
Ci(Ii) = Ii is optimal. When Ii > Ii , it is optimal to increase the cession Ci(Ii) up to
the level where the expected gain in the rms marginal value [1 + Z 0i(Ii   Ci)]E[B00(0)]
derived from ceded premiums matches the expected loss due to larger indemnity payment
E[B00(0) jCi ], hence a marginal cession rate
dCi
dIi
=
Z 00i (Ii   Ci)
Z 00i (Ii   Ci) + @E[B
0
0jCi]
@Ci
2 (0; 1);
where  = E[B00(0)]. The optimal indemnity schedule involves partial insurance at the
margin dIi(xi)=dxi 2 (0; 1) because an increase in coverage either involves an equivalent
increase in the risks incurred by the captive when Ii(xi) < Ii and also an increase in the
local insurers cost of capital which is only partially recouped through premium cessions
when Ii(xi) > Ii .
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Figure 4
Propositions 4 and 5 are illustrated by examples derived from the same basic assump-
tions as in Section 3 : 10 symmetric business units, Bi(i) = ln(i) for all i = 0; 1; : : : ; 10;
and each business unit facing the risk of an accident with probability p = 0:1, with lossesex uniformly distributed over [0; x] and x = 0:5. We restrict attention to piecewise linear
indemnity schedules. In the case of a constant marginal cost of capital (Proposition 4),
we thus assume that I
0
(x) is constant and equal to a 2 (0; 1) when x 2 [d0; d1 + I].27
Increasing cessions to the captive trades o¤ the advantages of an umbrella policy ob-
tained through the stop-loss reinsurance policy against the costs of the captives liabilities.
Table 2 conrms that ceteris paribus (i.e. for given values of c;  and w1) , the higher
k, the higher I because a higher capital cost makes risk cessions more protable. We
also observe that increasing  from 0:05 to 0:1 (with k = 0:03; 0:04 or 0:05; c = 0:05
and w1 = 1) leads to higher values for D, once again this the direct e¤ect of a higher
reinsurance loading, but it also leads to lower values for I because of an induced e¤ect
of the cost of retrocessions on optimal cessions. The e¤ects of changes of c and w1 are
as expected: when k = 0:03; 0:04 or 0:05; increasing c from 0:05 to 0:1 and keeping
 = 0:05 and w1 = 1 or increasing w1 from 1 to 2 and keeping 
c =  = 0:05 leads
to larger d0: these are standard price and wealth e¤ects associated with changes in the
loading factor or initial endowment.
Table 2 : Optimal reinsurance captive schemes
Parameters Variables
k c  w1 d
0 a I k D RRRH
0:03 0:05 0:05 1 0:07 0:92 0:04 0:088 0:07 38:2%
0:04 0:05 0:05 1 0:07 0:87 0:07 0:088 0:09 46:4%
0:05 0:05 0:05 1 0:06 0:77 0:07 0:088 0:09 46:4%
0:03 0:1 0:05 1 0:11 0:93 0:04 0:088 0:07 50:2%
0:04 0:1 0:05 1 0:11 0:87 0:06 0:088 0:08 55:8%
0:05 0:1 0:05 1 0:11 0:88 0:12 0:088 0:09 61:6%
0:03 0:05 0:1 1 0:07 0:94 0:03 0:088 0:10 36%
0:04 0:05 0:1 1 0:08 0:99 0:04 0:088 0:11 42%
0:05 0:05 0:1 1 0:09 1 0:05 0:088 0:12 47:7%
0:03 0:05 0:05 2 0:12 0:73 0:07 0:179 0:13 65:6%
0:04 0:05 0:05 2 0:11 0:69 0:12 0:179 0:15 76:1%
0:05 0:05 0:05 2 0:10 0:68 0:16 0:179 0:16 81:7%
The case of a convex cost of capital is illustrated by assuming Z(I) = kI+0:05I2; I 0(x) =
a if x 2 [d0; d1] and I 0(x) = b if x > d1 (or equivalently if I(x) > I) with 0 < a < b < 1.
27As in the simulations of Section 3, we assume f = 0:005; f0 = 0 and w0 = 0.
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The marginal cession rate is denoted as C
0
(I) = c, with 0 < c < 1 when I > I. Results
are in Table 3, with expected e¤ects of parameter changes. In particular, an increase in
the capital cost parameter k stimulates the risk cessions to the captive by increasing
both I and c.
Table 3 : The case of a convex cost of capital
Parameters Variables
k c  w1 d
0 a b I c k D RRRH
0:03 0:05 0:05 1 0:07 0:93 0:95 0:05 0:25 0:088 0:09 48:7%
0:04 0:05 0:05 1 0:07 0:85 0:97 0:06 0:58 0:088 0:10 52:3%
0:05 0:05 0:05 1 0:07 0:88 0:99 0:12 0:99 0:088 0:10 52:8%
0:03 0:1 0:05 1 0:11 0:93 0:95 0:05 0:19 0:088 0:08 57:9%
0:04 0:1 0:05 1 0:11 0:85 0:97 0:06 0:55 0:088 0:09 61%
0:05 0:1 0:05 1 0:10 0:82 0:99 0:11 0:99 0:088 0:09 61:1%
0:03 0:05 0:1 1 0:08 0:97 0:98 0:04 0:06 0:088 0:12 46:8%
0:04 0:05 0:1 1 0:08 0:94 0:95 0:05 0:09 0:088 0:13 52%
0:05 0:05 0:1 1 0:06 0:70 0:93 0:06 0:10 0:088 0:14 56:5%
0:03 0:05 0:05 2 0:10 0:65 0:91 0:09 0:20 0:179 0:15 75:6%
0:04 0:05 0:05 2 0:11 0:71 0:89 0:12 0:32 0:179 0:16 80:8%
0:05 0:05 0:05 2 0:11 0:72 0:99 0:17 0:99 0:179 0:16 81:9%
5 Conclusion
This paper has focused attention on the role of insurance and reinsurance captives as op-
timal risk sharing arrangements for large corporations with decentralized business units.
We have modelled the role of captives as self-insurance devices that pool risks, transfer
them to reinsurers and allow parent groups to o¤er optimal insurance coverage to business
units, either directly or through fronters. Several conclusions emerge from this analysis.
Firstly, reinsurance captives dominate insurance captives when standard direct insur-
ers have lower claims handling and underwriting costs than captives: indeed, through
a reinsurance captive the holding company may cumulate the benets drawn from the
lower costs of the fronters and the risk sharing optimality of an umbrella policy o¤ered by
retrocessionnaires. Secondly, the optimal insurance scheme of decentralized business units
involves deductible insurance contracts with partial coverage at the margin (at least when
losses are in some interval) when business units are insured either directly by an insurance
captive or through a fronter that cedes its risks to a reinsurance captive. Thirdly, when
local insurers act as fronters, they fully cede their risks to the reinsurance captive up to a
certain limit. Partial cessions above this limit are optimal under increasing marginal cost
of capital. The reinsurance captive retrocedes its risk to the reinsurance market through a
stop-loss contract, thereby o¤ering an umbrella insurance policy to the holding company.
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Fourthly, the optimal insurance coverage as well as the optimal cession and retrocession
operations depend on price parameters, and particularly on the capital cost of local in-
surers and on the loading factor of retrocessionnaires, as well as on initial endowments of
the business units. Variations across time of these cost and wealth parameters a¤ect the
attractivity of captive arrangements and may result in uctuations in the activity of the
captive industry.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
Let P0=fI0i (xi); P 0i ; t0i (xi); k0i for i = 1; : : : ; n;T 0(t1; : : : ; tn); Q0g a feasible insurance
captive scheme. Let C0 (resp. C1) be the set of business units such that (1+)(1+bci) 
1 + i and bfi  fi and that are insured (resp. not insured) by the captive under P0.
Let C2 be the set of other units, with C0 [ C1 [ C2 = f1; : : : ; ng. Consider another
feasible scheme P1 = fI1i (xi); P 1i ; t1i (xi); k1i for i = 1; : : : ; n;T 1(t1; : : : ; tn); Q1g, with
I1i (xi)  0; P 1i = 0; t1i (xi)  t0i (xi) + I0i (xi); k1i = k0i + P 0i if i 2 C0 [ C1 and I1i (xi) 
I0i (xi); P
1
i = P
0
i ; t
1
i (xi)  t0i (xi); k1i = k0i if i 2 C2. Let 0i (xi) and 1i (xi) be the current
cashows of business unit i respectively under P0 and P1 as a function of losses xi. We
obviously have 0i (xi)  1i (xi) from (1). Let for all i
i(ri) =
I0i (xi)
I0i (xi) + t
0
i (xi)
2 [0; 1] if I0i (xi) + t0i (xi) = ri > 0:
Since I0i (xi) and t
0
i (xi) are non-decreasing, i(ri) is well dened for all ri > 0. Let
T 1(t1; : : : ; tn)  T 0(: : : ; (1  i(ti))ti; : : :) +
X
i2C0[C1
(1 + bci)i(ti)ti: (15)
Using (3) and (15) gives
Q1 = (1 + )E[T 1(: : : ; t1i (exi); : : :)] + f0
= (1 + )E[T 0(: : : ; (1  i(t1i (exi)))t1i (exi); : : : ; )]
+(1 + )E
X
i2C0[C1
(1 + bci)i(t1i (exi))t1i (exi) + f0
Using (3) and (1  i(t1i (xi)))t1i (xi)  t0i (xi) and i(t1i (xi))t1i (xi)  I0i (xi) for all i yields
Q1 = Q0 + (1 + )E
X
i2C0[C1
(1 + bci)I0i (exi)  Q0 + X
i2C0[C1
(1 + i)EI
0
i (exi)
= Q0 +
X
i2C00[C1
(P 0i   fi): (16)
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where C 00  C0 refers to the set of business units that belongs to C0 and that are si-
multaneously insured by the captive and the local insurer in P0 28. Let 00(x1; : : : ; xn)
and 10(x1; : : : ; xn) be the prot of the captive respectively under P0 and P1. Let C 02 be
the subset of C2 that gathers the units of C2 that are insured by the captive (and also
possibly by local insurers). Under P1 the captive provides insurance to the business units
in C0 [ C1 [ C 02. Hence using (4), (15) and (16) gives
10(x1; : : : ; xn) =
nX
i=1
k1i  
X
i2C0[C1[C02
[(1 + bci)t1i (xi) + bfi] + T 1(: : : ; t1i (xi); : : :) Q1

nX
i=1
k1i  
X
i2C0[C1[C02
[(1 + bci)t1i (xi) + bfi] + T 0(: : : ; (1  i(t1i (xi)))t1i (xi); : : :)
+
X
i2C0[C1
(1 + bci)i(t1i (xi)t1i (xi) Q0   X
i2C00[C1
(P 0i   fi):
Using rstly (1  i(t1i (xi)))t1i (xi)  t0i (xi) for all i, secondly k1i = k0i + P 0i if i 2 C0 [ C1
with P 0i = 0 if i =2 C 00 and k1i = k0i if i 2 C2, thirdly t0i (xi)  0 if i 2 C1 and fourthly
t1i (xi) = t
0
i (xi) if i 2 C 02 then gives
10(x1; : : : ; xn) 
nX
i=1
k0i  
X
i2C0[C1[C02
bfi + X
i2C00[C1
P 0i + T
0(: : : ; t0i (xi); : : :)
 
X
i2C0[C02
(1 + bci)t0i (xi) Q0   X
i2C00[C1
(P 0i   fi)
=
nX
i=1
k0i  
X
i2C0[C02
[(1 + bci)t0i (xi) + bfi] + T 0(: : : ; t0i (xi); : : :) Q0
+
X
i2C1
(fi   bfi) +X
i2C00
fi
= 00(x1; : : : ; xn) +
X
i2C1
(fi   bfi) +X
i2C00
fi  00(x1; : : : ; xn):
Hence P1 weakly dominates P0 (it provides the same prot to each business units and
no lower prot to the captive in all states of the world). P1 strongly dominates P0 if
C 00 6= ? or if fi > bfi for at least one i in C1:
Given fIi(:); Pi; ti(:); ki for all i = 1; : : : ; ng the optimal reinsurance policy fT (:); Qg
maximizes EB0(0), where 0 is given by (4), subject to (3). Using the concavity of
B0(:) and the Umbrella Policy Theorem (see Gollier, 2000) shows that T (:) is a function
of the aggregate loss of the captive
P
i(1+
bci)ti(xi). Using  > 0 and a standard result in
28Note that I0i (xi)  0 if i 2 C0nC 00:
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optimal insurance contract theory then yields T (t1; : : : ; tn) 
hP
i(1 +
bci)ti  Di+, with
D > 0.
Proof of Proposition 2
Consider a given index i 2 f1; : : : ; ng. Let eyi  Pj 6=i(1 + bcj)tj(exj) and let Fi(yi) be
the cumulative distribution function of eyi over R, with Fi(0) = 0 and Fi(yi) = 1, where
yi =
P
j 6=i(1 + bcj)tj(xj). Choosing kj; Ij(:) and tj(:) optimally for all j 6= i, and thus for
an optimal distribution Fi(yi), the optimal insurance captive scheme maximizes
xiZ
0
D (1+bci )ti(xi)Z
 1
B0
 
nX
j=1
kj   yi   (1 + bci)ti(xi) X
j2Ac
bfj  Q! dFi(yi)d(xi)
+
xiZ
0
[1  Fi(D   (1 + bci)ti(xi))]B0
 
nX
j=1
kj  D  
X
j2Ac
bfj  Q! d(xi)
+
xiZ
0
Bi (wi   xi + Ii(xi)  Pi + ti(xi)  ki ) di(xi);
with respect to D; Q; ki; Pi and Ii(:); ti(:)  0, subject to
Pi = (1 + 
c
i + 
k
i )
xiZ
0
Ii(xi)d(xi) + fi if i 2 A`; (17)
Pi = 0 if i =2 A`; (18)
Q = (1 + )
xiZ
0
Z yi
D (1+bci )ti(xi)(yi + (1 +
bci)ti(xi) D)dFi(yi) d(xi)
+f0: (19)
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Let  and  be Lagrange multipliers associated with (17) and (19) respectively and
let
EB00 
Z xi
0
D (1+bci )ti(xi)Z
 1
B00
 
nX
j=1
kj   yi   (1 + bci)ti(xi) X
j2Ac
bfj  Q! dFi(yi)d(xi)
+
xiZ
0
[1  Fi(D   (1 + bci)ti(xi))]B00
 
nX
j=1
kj  D  
X
j2Ac
bfj  Q! d(xi);
EB0i 
xiZ
0
Bi (wi   xi + Ii(xi)  Pi + ti(xi)  ki ) di(xi):
The rst-order optimality conditions on Pi and Ii(:) respectively give EB0i =  and
B0i (wi   xi + Ii(xi)  Pi   ki )
 (1 + ci + ki )  0; = 0 if Ii(xi) > 0;
(20)
if i 2 A` (and thus i =2 Ac), which yields Ii(xi) = (xi   d0i )+, with d01 > 0. The optimality
conditions associated with ki; Q; D; ti(:)respectively give
EB0i = EB
0
0; (21)
EB00 = ; (22)
(1 + ) = B00
 
nX
j=1
kj  D  
X
j2Ac
bfj  Q! ; (23)
B0i (wi   xi + ti(xi)  ki )
 (1 + bci)E[B00 j ti(xi)]  0; = 0 if ti(xi) > 0; (24)
for i 2 Ac (and thus i =2 A`) where
E[B00 j t] 
D (1+bi)tZ
 1
B00
 
nX
j=1
kj   yi   (1 + bci)t X
j2Ac
bfj  Q! dFi(yi)
+[1  Fi(D   (1 + bci)t)]B00
 
nX
j=1
kj  D  
X
j2Ac
bfj  Q! ; (25)
and
@E[B00 j t]
@t
=  (1 + bci)
D (1+bci )tZ
 1
B000
 
nX
j=1
kj   yi  
X
j2Ac
bfj  Q! dFi(yi) > 0:
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Di¤erentiating (24) gives
dti
dxi
=
B00i (wi   xi + ti(xi)  ki )
B00i (wi   xi + ti(xi)  ki )  (1 + bi) @E[B00jt]@t 
t=ti(xi)
;
and thus dti=dxi 2 (0; 1) if ti(xi) > 0. (24) implies ti(xi) = 0 if xi 2 [0; d1i ] and ti(xi) > 0
if xi > d1i where d
1
i is such that B
0
i(wi   d1i   ki) = (1 + bci)E[B00 j 0]. Suppose d1i  0.
(24) would then give
EB0i =
xiZ
0
B0i (wi   xi + ti(xi)  ki ) di(xi) = (1 + bci) xiZ
0
E[B00 j ti(xi)]di(xi)
= (1 + bci)EB00 > EB00;
hence a contradiction with (21).
Proof of Proposition 3
Let P0 = fI0i (xi); P 0i ; t0i (xi); k0i ; C0i (Ii); K0i for i = 1; : : : ; n;T 0(t1; : : : ; tn; C1; : : : ; Cn); Q0g
a feasible insurance-reinsurance captive scheme. Let C0 (resp. C1) be the set of business
units such that ci  bci(1 + ) and fi  bfi and that are directly insured only by the
captive (resp. directly coinsured by the local insurer and the captive) under P0. Let C2
be the set of other business units, with C0 [ C1 [ C2 = f1; : : : ; ng. Let
i(ri) =
I0i (xi)
I0i (xi) + t
0
i (xi)
2 [0; 1] if I0i (xi) + t0i (xi) = ri > 0 if i 2 C0 [ C1;
i(ri)  1 if i 2 C2:
Consider another insurance schemeP1 = fI1i (xi); P 1i ; t1i (xi); k1i ; C1i (Ii); K1i for i = 1; : : : ; n;T 1(t1; : : : ; tn; C1; : : : ; Cn); Q1g
such that
I1i (xi)  I0i (xi) + t0i (xi) if i 2 C0 [ C1;
C1i (Ii)  C0i (i(Ii)Ii) + (1  i(Ii))Ii if i 2 C0 [ C1;
k1i  k0i   (1 + i)Et0i (exi)  fi if i 2 C0;
k1i  k0i   (1 + i)Et0i (exi) if i 2 C1;
I1i (xi)  I0i (xi); C1i (Ii)  C0i (Ii); t1i (xi)  t0i (xi); k1i = k0i if i 2 C2;
with P 1i given by (2) for all i and Q
1 given by (3). Since P 1i + k
1
i = P
0
i + k
0
i and
I1i (xi)+ t
1
i (xi)  I0i (xi)+ t0i (xi), we have 1i (xi)  0i (xi) for all i where 0i (xi) and 1i (xi)
respectively denote the current cashows of business unit i under P0 and P1 as functions
of losses xi. Let also
T 1(: : : ; ti; : : : ; Ci; : : :) = T
0(: : : ; t0i; : : : ; C
0
i; : : :) 
X
i2C0[C1
bit0i; (26)
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where
t0i = (1  i(Ii)Ii and C 0i = C0i (i(Ii)Ii with Ii = (C1i ) 1(Ci) if i 2 C0 [ C1;
t0i = ti and C
0
i = Ci if i 2 C2;
For all i 2 C0[C1, when direct insurer i pays indemnity Ii to business unit i and receives
C1i (Ii) from the captive under P1, he pays t0i = (1   i(Ii)Ii to business unit i and he
receives C 0i = C
0
i (i(Ii)Ii from the captive under P0. We thus have
Q0 = (1 + )E[T 0(: : : ; t0i; : : : ; C
0
i; : : :) + f0]:
Consequently,
Q1 = (1 + )E[T 1(: : : t1i (ex1); : : : ; Ci(Ii(exi)) : : : ; )] + f0
= Q0   (1 + )
X
i2C0[C1
biEt0i (exi): (27)
Let C 02 be the subset of C2 that gathers the units of C2 that are directly insured by the
captive (and also possibly by local insurers). Under P1 only the business units of C 02 are
directly insured by the captive. Let 00(x1; : : : ; xn) and 
1
0(x1; : : : ; xn) be the prot of the
captive respectively under P0 and P1We have
10(x1; : : : ; xn) =
nX
i=1
k1i  
X
i2C02
[(1 + bci)t1i (xi) + bfi] + nX
i=1
[K1i   C1i (I1i (xi))]
+T 1(: : : ; t1i (xi); : : : ; C
1
i (I
1
i (xi)) : : : ; ) Q1
=
nX
i=1
k1i  
X
i2C02
[(1 + bci)t1i (xi) + bfi] + nX
i=1
[K0i   Ci(I0i (xi))]
+
X
i2C0[C1
[(1 + ki )Et
0
i (exi)  t0i (xi)]
+T 1(: : : ; t1i (xi); : : : ; C
1
i (I
1
i (xi) : : : ; ) Q1:
Using (26),(27) and
nX
i=1
k1i =
nX
i=1
k0i  
X
i2C0[C1
(1 + i)Et
0
i (exi) X
i2C0
fi
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gives
10(x1; : : : ; xn) =
nX
i=1
k0i  
X
i2C0[C1[C02
[(1 + bci)t0i (xi) + bfi]
+
nX
i=1
[K0i   Ci(I0i (xi))] + T 0(: : : ; t0i (xi); : : : ; C0i (I0i (xi) : : : ; ) Q0
+
X
i2C0[C1
[bci(1 + )  ci ]Et0i (exi) +X
i2C0
( bfi   fi) +X
i2C1
fi
= 10(x1; : : : ; xn)
+
X
i2C0[C1
[bci(1 + )  ci ]Et0i (exi) +X
i2C0
( bfi   fi) +X
i2C1
fi
 10(x1; : : : ; xn):
Hence in an optimal insurance scheme, any business unit i such that ci  bci(1 + ) and
fi  bfi should be directly insured by the local insurer only, possibly with reinsurance by
the captive.
Given the transfer schedules ti(xi) and Ci(Ii), the captive bears a total random costPn
i=1[(1+
bci)ti(xi)+Ci(Ii(xi))]. The umbrella policy theorem then shows that the optimal
reinsurance contract of the captive species a transfer schedule T , which depends on this
total loss, and using  > 0 a standard result in insurance contract theory shows that it is
a straight deductible contract.
Proof of Proposition 4
Part 1 :
We rst characterize functions Ci(Ii). Consider a given index i 2 f1; : : : ; ng. Let
ezi X
j 6=i
Cj(Ij(exj))
and let Gi(zi) be the cumulative distribution function of ezi over R, with Gi(0) = 0 and
Gi(zi) = 1, where zi =
P
j 6=iCj(Ij(xj)). Let  i(Ii) be the cumulative distribution function
of eIi  Ii(exi) over [0; I i], with I i = Ii(xi). For Kj; Cj(:) chosen optimally for all j 6= i
and kj; Ij(:) chosen optimally for all j, and thus for optimal induced distributions Gi(zi)
and  i(Ii), the optimal insurance scheme maximizesZ Ii
0
8<:
D Ci(Ii))Z
 1
B0
 
nX
j=1
(kj +Kj)  zi   Ci(Ii)) Q
!
dGi(zi)
+[1 Gi(D   Ci(Ii))]B0
 
nX
j=1
(kj +Kj) D  Q
!)
d i(Ii)
29
with respect to Q; D; Ki; Ci(:) subject to
Ki = (1 + 
k
i )
IiZ
0
Ci(Ii)d i(Ii); (28)
Q = (1 + )
IiZ
0
Z yi
D Ci(Ii)
(zi + Ci(Ii) D)dGi(zi)

d i(Ii) + f0; (29)
0  Ci(Ii)  Ii for all Ii 2 [0; I i]: (30)
Let  and  be Lagrange multipliers respectively associated with (28) and (29). The
rst-order optimality conditions associated with Ki and Q are written as
EB00 =  = ; (31)
where
EB00 
Z Ii
0
8<:
D Ci(Ii))Z
 1
B00
 
nX
j=1
(kj +Kj)  zi   Ci(Ii)) Q
!
dGi(zi)
+[1 Gi(D   Ci(Ii))]B00
 
nX
j=1
(kj +Kj) D  Q)
!)
d i(Ii):
The rst-order optimality conditions associated with D and Ci(:) yield
(1 + ) = B00
 
nX
j=1
(kj +Kj) D  Q
!
; (32)
and
(1 + ki )  E[B00 j Ci(Ii)]  0; = 0 if Ci(Ii) < Ii; (33)
where
E[B00 j C] 
D CZ
 1
B00
 
nX
j=1
(kj +Kj)  zi   C  Q
!
dGi(zi)
+[1 Gi(D   C)]B00
 
nX
j=1
(kj +Kj) D  Q
!
: (34)
We have
@E[B00 j C]
@C
=  
D CZ
 1
B000 (
nX
j=1
(kj +Kj)  zi   C  Q)dGi(zi) > 0:
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Hence from (33), we have Ci(Ii) = Ii if Ii  Ii and Ci(Ii) = Ii if Ii > Ii , where Ii is
given by (1 + ki )  E[B00 j Ii ] = 0:
Part 2 :
We now characterize functions Ii(xi). We know that there exists Ii such that Ci(Ii) =
minfIi; Ii g. Choosing optimally kj; Kj; Ij(:) for all j 6= i and Cj(:) for all j, and thus for
an optimal distribution Gi(zi), the optimal insurance scheme maximizes
xiZ
0
D Ci(I(xi))Z
 1
B0
 
nX
j=1
(kj +Kj)  zi   Ci(Ii(xi)) Q
!
dGi(zi)di(xi)
+
xiZ
0
[1 Gi(D   Ci(Ii(xi)))]B0
 
nX
j=1
(kj +Kj) D  Q
!
di(xi)
+
xiZ
0
Bi (wi   xi + Ii(xi)  Pi   ki) di(xi);
with respect to D; Q; ki; Ki; Pi; Ii(:)  0, subject to
Ki = (1 + 
k
i )
xiZ
0
Ci(Ii(xi))di(xi); (35)
Q = (1 + )
xiZ
0
Z yi
D Ci(I(xi))
(zi + Ci(Ii(xi)) D)dGi(zi)

d(xi)
+f0; (36)
Pi = (1 + 
c
i + 
k
i )
xiZ
0
Ii(xi)di(xi) + fi; (37)
The rst-order optimality conditions on ki; Ki; Pi and Q yield
 =  =  = EB00 = EB
0
i (38)
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where multipliers ;  and  are respectively associated with (35),(36) and (37) and
EB00 =
xiZ
0
D Ci(I(xi))Z
 1
B00
 
nX
j=1
(kj +Kj)  zi   Ci(Ii(xi)) Q
!
dGi(zi)di(xi)
+
xiZ
0
[1 Gi(D   Ci(Ii(xi)))]B00
 
nX
j=1
(kj +Kj) D  Q
!
di(xi);
EB0i =
xiZ
0
B0i (wi   xi + Ii(xi)  Pi   ki) di(xi):
At any point where Ci(Ii) is di¤erentiable, i.e. when Ii 6= Ii , the rst-order optimality
condition on Ii(:) is written as
B0i(wi   xi + Ii(xi)  Pi   ki)
+(1 + ki )C
0
i(Ii(xi))  (1 + ci + ki )
 C 0i(Ii(xi))E[B00 j Ci(Ii(xi))]  0; = 0 if Ii(xi) > 0; (39)
where we use B00(
Pn
j=1(kj +Kj)  D   Q) = (1 + ), which as before results from the
optimality condition on D.
When Ii(xi) > Ii , we have C
0
i(Ii(xi)) = 0, and (39) gives
B0i(wi   xi + Ii(xi)  Pi   ki) = (1 + ci + ki ) (40)
Since B00i < 0, (40) implies that Ii(xi) = xi   d1i with
B0i(wi   d1i   Pi   ki) = (1 + ci + ki ) (41)
.
When 0 < Ii(xi) < Ii , we have C
0
i(Ii(xi)) = 1 and (39) gives
B0i(wi   xi + Ii(xi)  Pi   ki)
+(1 + ki )  (1 + ci + ki ) = E[B00 j Ci = Ii(xi)];
which yields
B0i(wi   xi + Ii(xi)  Pi   ki) = ci + E[B00 j Ci = Ii(xi)]: (42)
Di¤erentiating (42) gives
dIi
dxi
=
B00i (wi   xi + Ii(xi)  Pi   ki)
B00i (wi   xi + Ii(xi)  Pi   ki)  @E[B
0
0jC]
@C

C=Ii(xi)
2 (0; 1):
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Hence dIi=dxi 2 (0; 1) when xi 2 (d0i ; Ii + d1i ) where d0i is such that
B0i(wi   d0i   Pi   ki) = ci + E[B00 j 0]; (43)
and we have Ii(xi) = 0 if xi 2 [0; d0i ]. Using (41) and (42) allows us to write
EB0i =
d0iZ
0
B0i(wi   xi   Pi   ki)di(xi)
+
Z Ii +d1i
d0i
B0i(wi   xi + Ii(xi)  Pi   ki)di(xi)
+[1  i(Ii + d1i )]B0i(wi   d1i   Pi   ki)
=
d0iZ
0
B0i(wi   xi   Pi   ki)di(xi)
+
Z Ii +d1i
d0i
fci + E[B00 j Ii(xi)]gdi(xi)
+(1 + ci + 
k
i )[1  i(Ii + d1i )]:
If d0i = 0, we would have
EB0i =
Z Ii +d1i
0
fci + E[B00 j Ii(xi)]gdi(xi)
+(1 + ci + 
k
i )[1  i(Ii + d1i )] < ; (44)
where the last inequality follows from E[B00 j Ii(xi)] < (1 + ki ) for all xi 2 [0; Ii + d1i ).
(44) would then contradict (38). We thus have d0i > 0.
Proof of Proposition 5
The proof is similar to the proof of Proposition 4. In Part 1, (28) is replaced by
Ki =
IiZ
0
[Ci(Ii) + Zi(Ii)  Zi(Ii   Ci(Ii))]d i(Ii): (45)
Let  and  be Lagrange multipliers respectively associated with (45) and (29). The
rst-order optimality conditions associated with D and Ci(:) still yield (32), while (33) is
replaced by
Ai(Ii; Ci(Ii))  0 if Ci(Ii) = Ii > 0;
= 0 if 0 < Ci(Ii) < Ii
 0 if Ci(Ii) = 0 < Ii:
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where
Ai(I; C)  [1 + Z 0i(I   C)]  E[B00 j C];
and E[B00 j C] is still given by (34). Note that
 = EB00 =
Z Ii
0
E[B00 j Ci(Ii)]d i(Ii) > E[B00 j 0]: (46)
Hence we have Ai(I; 0) = f1+Z 0i(I)] E[B00 j 0]g > Z 0i(I) > 0, which gives Ci(Ii) > 0
if Ii > 0. For all Ii such that 0 < Ci(Ii) < Ii, we have Ai(Ii; Ci(Ii)) = 0, which gives
dCi
dIi
=
Z 00i (Ii   Ci)
Z 00i (Ii   Ci) + @E[B
0
0jCi]
@Ci
2 (0; 1):
and we have Ci(Ii) < Ii if Ai(Ii; Ii) = [1+Z 0i(0)] E[B00 j Ii] < 0, which implies Ii > Ii
where Ii is given by [1 + Z
0
i(0)]  E[B00 j Ii ] = 0: We have Ci(Ii) = Ii when Ii  Ii .
In Part 2, (35) and (37) are respectively replaced by
Ki =
xiZ
0
[Ci(Ii(xi) + Zi(Ii(xi))  Zi(Ii(xi)  Ci(Ii(xi))] d(xi); (47)
and
Pi =
xiZ
0
[(1 + ci)Ii(xi) + Zi(Ii(xi))] d(xi) + fi; (48)
while (36) is unchanged. Let ; ; and  be the Lagrance multipliers, which are respec-
tively associated with (46), (36) and (47). (38) still holds and (39) is replaced by
B0i(wi   xi + Ii(xi)  Pi   ki)
+[C 0i(Ii(xi)) + Z
0
i(Ii(xi))  Z 0i(Ii(xi)  Ci(Ii(xi)))(1  C 0i(Ii(xi))]
 (1 + ci + Z 0i(Ii(xi)))
 C 0i(Ii(xi))E[B00 j Ci(Ii(xi))]  0; = 0 if Ii(xi) > 0; (49)
The remaining part of the proof then straightforwardly replicates the proof of Proposition
4. In particular, (42) still holds when 0 < Ii(xi) < Ii , which gives dIi=dxi 2 (0; 1) in
that case. When Ii(xi) > Ii , we have
B0i(wi   xi + Ii(xi)  Pi   ki) = [1 + ci + Z 0i(Ii(xi)  Ci(Ii(xi)))];
which also gives dIi=dxi 2 (0; 1). Function Ii(xi) has a non-di¤erentiable point when
Ii(xi) = I

i , which is reached at xi = d
1
i and a straighforward computation gives I
0
i+(d
1
i ) >
I 0i (d
1
i ).
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